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ABSTRACT 
Evidence has been documented in the literature that the interest based 
debt financing system is experiencing continuous discomfort. The 
outcome of the 2008 global financial crisis has further create fresh vigor 
to the assertion. Also, these authors have submitted that debt and 
leveraging are the two major causes of financial instability in the present 
system. This paper claims that the existence of the interest-based debt 
regime is becoming less acceptable, as excessive debt can affect the whole 
economic system, even in a developed country like United States. From 
an economic viewpoint, therefore, by banning interest rate-based 
contracts and decreeing exchange contracts, Islamic financeinspires risk 
sharing and prohibits risk transfer, risk shedding, and risk shifting. The 
paper proposes risk sharing based Islamic financing as a suitable 
alternative to the interest based debt financing. This study concludes 
that risk-sharing finance has several benefits, especially its potential to 
minimize, if not circumvent, the debt prompted financial crises that 
have beset the world. 
. 
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A. INTRODUCTION 
Corporate financing decisions are quite intricate processes and present 
theories can at best clarify only certain aspects of the diversity and intricacy of 
financing choices (Margaritis, &Psillaki, 2010). However, Modigliani and Miller 
(1958) and others have uncovered that the debt-equity choice is intricate by a 
number of factors other than relative cost. The main benefit of debt financing, 
relative to equity, is the fact that it results to no dilution in ownership and then in 
future earnings (Bacha, Mirakhor& Askari, 2015). Essentially, there are two major 
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ways in which firms choose to finance their asset, through debt or equity. This can 
be achieved through bank loans, bonds, account payable and line credit as well as 
retained earnings and preferred stock (Ross, Westerfield& Jaffe, 2002). The 
relationship between debt and equity is usually measured with the debt proportion 
ratio and represent the capital structure of a firm (Mc Menamin, 1999). 
However, it has been documented in the literature that the interest based debt 
financing system is experiencing continues discomfort. The outcome of the 2008 
global financial crisis has further create fresh vigor to the assertion. Also, these 
studies have submitted that debt and leveraging are the two major causes of 
financial instability in the present system (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). However, 
in a well-organized capital markets, the dissimilarity between the price of equity 
and debt should replicate the contrast in risk profile. Likewise, debt financing has 
positive relationship with risk. Therefore, on equilibrium, a risk neutral firm would 
get no benefit in switching equity with debt (putting aside the issue of taxes). 
Hitherto, this may not be true. Since, several crises have revealed that there is a 
strong inclination, if not an absolute bias, for debt (Bacha, Mirakhor& Askari, 
2015) 
A central feature of the interest-based system is that the risks associated with 
the debt contract are shifted from the creditor to the debtor. The creditor is 
assured a return irrespective of the result of the business activity of the debtor 
(Othman, et.al. 2017). More so, this system of risk transfer will empower the rich 
to become richer and the poor becomes poorer. Thus, constant transfer of risk with 
interest rate based debt instruments are not helping the mutual well-being. Risk 
sharing may perhaps provide an effective replacement (Mirakhor,2012). Therefore, 
the topic of risk management became a matter of interest not only to the business 
organizations but also to the policy makers (Othman, et.al. 2017). Therefore, it 
brings to the rise of the need for private firms to understand the risk sharing 
instruments of Islamic finance to overcome the debt dilemma in their capital 
structure decision (Bacha, 2017). 
 
B.  THEORITICAL 
1.   The Debt-Equity Ratio Choice 
Empirical researches on the debt-equity ratio choice have significantly 
increased in the wake of the prominent seminal works of Modigliani and Miller 
(1963).  Modigliani and Miller suggested the application of more debt by firms in 
their CS to maximize value, achieved through high profit, increased share prices and 
efficiency in management. On the other hand (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) argued 
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that, although debt may generate a higher return to shareholders, it may result in 
additional agency costs in the form of covenants and monitoring actions.  (Myers, 
1977) identified two tax advantages two benefits of debt which includes and the 
reduced agency cost of the free cash flows.  Its cost according to him includes 
bankruptcy costs and increased agency costs when firm credit worthiness is in 
doubt. 
However, capital structure is the combination of long-term sources of funds used 
by a firm, namely non-current liabilities and equity. Generally, bonds (debt 
securities) and long-term loans are categorized under non-current liabilities while 
equity is denoted by preferred and common shares (Keown, Martin, Petty, & Scott, 
2008). Therefore, a firm can select any type of capital structure. When a company 
issues more bonds, the debt equity ratio will increase. On the other hand, a 
company that issues more shares decreases its debt-to-equity ratio (Ross, 
Westerfield, & Jordan, 1999). 
Furthermore (Esperança and Matias, 2005) argues that debt issuance is 
associated with an increasing risk which should be covered from equity return. A 
study by Borges et al. (2007) revealed that the key indicators associated to capital 
structure choices are equity-debt-solvability ratios. As they decide the amount of 
equity and debt while companies finance their assets independently from respective 
nature and function, as well as express the ability to pay corresponding debts. 
Harvey, (2014) affirmed that debt finance played a restraining role for managers 
and forced them to operate hardy to enhance the company solvency, so increasing 
the debt ratio can improve the value of the firm. (Hadlock & James, 2002), 
(Margaritis & Psillaki, 2010) and (Berger &Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006) had also 
come to the same conclusion in their empirical studies.  
2. Implications of Excessive Debt 
During the financial crises, everyone looked at debt as a risky instrument 
(Fong, 2008; 2009). Hence, excessive debt can upset the entire economic system, 
even in a developed country like United States. Similarly, with respects to business 
corporations, there is no hesitation that leverage is a cause of tax shielding (Myers, 
2001) and that the owner of the company uses it as a strategy to control the 
decision making process since the company does not have any public shareholding 
(Baumol, 1965). (Nevertheless, Stone, 2000) stressed that financial crisis is 
permanently linked with company debt based on his studies of the consequences of 
financial crisis for company output.  
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(Ross eta, 1999) and (Fong, 2008) further contend that the prospect of a 
firm facing financial torture is great when the firm is over-leveraged. Norita and 
(Shamsul Nahar, 2004) claim that the debt ratio for financially troubled firms is 
greater than in vigorous companies. Moreover, (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009) 
maintained that all crises of the past have been, at their core, debt crises, 
irrespective of whether they were categorized as “currency” or “banking” crises. In 
addition, it is further projected that there are about USD200 trillion value of paper 
securities in the worldwide economy of which USD150 trillion are interest rate-
based debt instruments (Rogoff, 2011). 
Therefore, to put up with a strong financial structure, managers of 
corporation need to select a combination of equity and debt in order to lower the 
weighted average cost of capital. However, by reducing the cost of capital, the value 
of the company can be maximized, thus, making better return to shareholders and 
stakeholders (Keown etal., 2005). Nevertheless, sometimes the cost of capital 
increases as the volume of debt rises. This turn out to be more serious when the 
cost of capital rises and the value of the firm drops as the level of debt goes up. 
Therefore, under this situation, the benefit of debt financing is offset by the costs 
of financial distress, and this results a greater problem of bankruptcy (Ross etal., 
1999). 
3.  The Concept of Risk Sharing in Islamic Finance 
Risk sharing is one of the most significant aspect needed in Islam for the 
unity of mankind. Basically, Islamic finance is a financial arrangement structured on 
risk sharing (Othman, et.al. 2017). Islam is a rules-based system in which a grid of 
given rules administers the socio-economic and political life of the public 
(Mirakhor and Hamid, 2009). Therefore, abiding by these guidelines makes the 
people a union of joint support by demanding individuals to share the risks of life 
(Mirakhor, 2010; Askari, et. al., 2012). Manage financial volatility and to permit 
consumption smoothing, which is a key result of risk sharing and uplifts the 
welfare of the parties to the exchange. Thus, the prominence on risk sharing is 
provide in the holy Qur’anconcerning economic behavior. The Qur`an states that; 
 “they say that indeed al-bay’ is like al-riba. But Allah has permitted al-bay’ 
(exchange contract) and has forbidden al-riba (interest-based debt contract)” 
(2:275).  
Furthermore, as the Qur’an for bids all debt contracts based on interest, it 
concurrently proclaims a substitute. However, the alternative to debt-based 
contracts is al-bay’—which means, a mutual exchange in which one package of 
property rights is exchanged for another, hence allowing both parties involve to 
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share all risks involved. It also permits both parties to an exchange to ease the risk 
of income. 
The Qur’an further recommends that risk sharing, alongside with other 
approved social rules such as cooperation (Qur’an, 5:2), and encourages human 
cohesion by taking humanity closer to unity, which in itself is a result of Islam’s 
principal axiom, i.e. the unity of the creator. However, an Islamic philosophic 
axiom proclaims that from one creator only one creation can issue. The Qur’anit 
self clearly states: 
  “Neither your creation (was) nor your resurrection (will be) other than as one 
united soul” (Qur’an, 31:28)  
Moreover, in a sequence of verses, the Qur’an urges people to take 
individual and collective actions to attain societal unity and cohesion and at the 
same time try to reserve and keep collectivity from all elements of disunity (for 
example, Qur`an 3:103). So, encouraging maximum risk sharing is, unarguably, the 
ultimate objective of Islamic finance. It is for this reason that scholars consider 
profit–loss sharing and equity participation as first best instruments of risk sharing 
(Mirakhor and Iqbal, 2007). In this manner, social integration is enhanced. 
4.    Islamic Finance is Equity-Based and Risk-Sharing Finance 
The basic principle of Islamic finance is the avoidance of interest and all 
contracts based on interest. Thus, Qur’an considers charging of interest as a serious 
violation of Islamic rule (see Qur`an 2:276), which is reflected as an act of 
injustice. However, full comprehension of the essence of these verses which 
prescribed that interest based debt transactions need to be substituted by contracts 
of exchange necessitates an analysis of the particularities of the two contracts 
(Askari et. al., 2012). While stressing the advantage of a system mainly based on 
equity financing, (Einaudi, 2006) submit “A modern market economy needs 
financial contracts. In theory these could all take equity form, and if they did 
economies would suffer less macroeconomic instability”.  
(Likewise, Taleb, 2012) maintained that for a financial system to escape 
fragility and the happening of black swans, the system requires to get free of debt 
financing and choose equity financing. Besides, with equity financing all 
participants will partake extra skinin the game. This means that, no one would be 
in a situation to have the upside without sharing the downside, mostly when others 
may be injured. This would unavoidably oblige and even reduce moral hazards and 
agency problems; features that will continuously be pervasive in a debt based system 
(see also Hellwig, 1998) 
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Again, Stiglitz (1989) compared the structures of equity and debt contracts 
and claims that from the viewpoint of the entrepreneur, equity possessed two 
advantages. Firstly, the risk of the project is shared with the provider of capital, and 
there is no fixed commitment for paying back the funds. Hence, in a situation of 
failure, payments to the capital provider are adjourned. Moreover, the company will 
not be found bankrupt, and will not be obligated to put in place any measures to 
plank off bankruptcy. Likewise, looking at it from a social point of view, equity 
possessed a distinct advantage: since risks are jointly shared between the 
entrepreneur and the provider of the capital, it indicates that  firm will not usually 
cut production than it would with debt finance, especially when the economy 
experienced a downturn (see also Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986). 
Therefore, by prohibiting interest rate-based contracts and decreeing 
contracts based on exchange and mutual benefits, the Qur’an inspires risk sharing 
and forbids risk transfer, risk flaking, and risk shifting. However, under a classic 
risk-sharing plan such as equity finance, the parties in the contracts share the risk 
and also the return of a contract. In contrast, under an interest rate-based debt 
contract the risk involved the business operation is shifted from the sponsor to the 
borrower, through which the financier holding not only the rights to claim the 
principal and interest but as well  any collateral that stand as  guarantee to the 
financing agreement. Furthermore, under a risk sharing plan, such as equity 
arrangement, the investment is made on a profitable trade and production activities, 
also the revenues attached to the business are not known at the beginning of the 
investment, and are as a result, a random variable resulting in equities to be a risky 
assets.  
5.   Risk-Sharing instruments and the debt-equity choice 
In corporate finance, there is a trade-off between debt and equity financing. 
However, debt is considered cheaper but more risky than equity. Equity, though 
assumed to be safer, is not only more costly but can result undesirable ownership 
dilution (Bacha, 2017). Generally, due to this trade-off, companies are 
oftendisposed to use debt financing. (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) have also argued 
that, the debt-equity choice is intricate by a number of factors other than relative 
cost. The main benefit of debt financing over equity, is the fact that it results to no 
erosion in ownership and so in future earnings. Thus, firms attributed to 
concentrated ownership may likely have higher financial leverage. As such, 
companies inclined to finance low-risk, high return projects with debt and high-risk 
projects with equity (Bacha, Mirakhor& Askari, 2015). Incidentally, the problem 
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with equity is that since it is assume to be everlasting, the dilution in ownership is 
also perpetual. By contrast, debt is terminal 
 
Figure 1 
Impact of funding alternatives on project risk 
Risk Post Funding 
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Moreover, (Bacha,Mirakhor&Askari, 2015) identified five motives why 
companies are enticed to debt financing.  the financier, for instance, he may prefer 
debt over equity because: (i) the risk of the business is not shared with him; (ii) he 
can also make a claim on the business risk though not involved; (iii) irrespective of 
the performance of the borrower he is ‘assured’ of a fixed return; and (iv) whereas 
equity is persistent in claim and everlasting in time, debt is fixed in claim and time. 
On the other hand, for risk-sharing instrument to be workable, it should 
deliver the benefits of debt without the attendant leverage, be cost-effective, and be 
striking to both potential borrowers and financiers (Bacha, 2017). It is expected 
also be practical and objectively simple. In addition, investors should be able to 
simply comprehend how the instrument works and it’s pricing. If the instrument 
can possessed structures of the current market-traded instruments, it can easily 
attract market acceptance. Besides, gain Muslims acceptance, the instrument must 
conform with Shari`ah requirements (Bacha, Mirakhor& Askari, 2015) 
6.   Potential of Risk-Sharing Instruments for corporate financing 
Prior studies have identified the potentiality of risk-sharing instruments to 
neutralize some of the elements that result in debt to be attractive. Accordingly 
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these instruments must offer the benefits of debt without the associated leverage, be 
cost-effective and also be attractive to both prospective borrowers and financiers 
(Bacha, 2017).They should also be practical and demonstrably simple. However, 
(Bacha, Mirakhor& Askari, 2015) suggested two generic conditions where risk-
sharing instruments can be used to finance a project, i.e. to finance a revenue 
generating project and non-revenue-generating project.  
7.  Funding revenue generating projects 
In a situation where, RS instrument is utilized to finance a revenue-generating asset, 
the risk sharing should be in line with the generated income by the asset. This 
means that, the revenue to the financier will be in direct connection to the income 
generated by the project. Under such condition, it is similar to equity instrument. 
Nevertheless, different to a new issue of common stock, which would have a right 
on all the current assets together with the new project, this RS instrument would 
therefore, have a claim only on the earnings of the new project.  
Meanwhile, the original contract can be a modified mudarabahor musharakahput 
together with a wakalah. Also, the instrument have a fixed term and will remain 
terminal. However, the term will depend on the following factors:  
1) The economic life of the venture or underlying asset 
2) Cash flows/earnings generated 
3) Profit-sharing ratio (PSR); and 
4) Required return given the riskiness of the project.  
Furthermore, the term would be formulated in such a way that for a certain PSR 
and required return, the investor may expect his initial investment back plus his 
profit. This instrument can be listed and traded on secondary markets. However, 
secondary trading offers a lot of benefits, such as greater liquidity, that will entice a 
wider range of investors.  
 
C. METHODOLOGY 
In essence, the use of small denominations may attract small retailers and 
this can be promoted if dealings in these instruments can as well be managed 
through banks and establishments such as the post office. Moreover, this will allow 
investors especially from rural areas to partake with their minor savings. For 
instance, a potential investor from rural community who is interested can purchase 
at existing prices and retail via his local bank or post office with the transaction 
being affected at the day’s closing price much like mutual funds. 
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Fundamentally, pricing ought to be in line with the rationality of valuation in 
finance. That is value should equal the present-value of future expected cash flows 
from the investment. Basically: 
Price =∑
ȇ∙𝑃𝑆𝑅
(1+𝐾)𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=1  ................................(1) 
Where ȇ𝑡 stand for the projected net earnings in year t, PSR represents the 
profit sharing ratio, and k is the required return/profit rate. Therefore, the 
expected net earnings can be determined based on the parameters agreed to and the 
forecasted revenue/earnings.  
As an alternative, after-tax net cash flows can as well be used in place of êt. After-
tax net cash flows start with net profit and adjust for non-cash expenses such as 
depreciation, amortizations, provisions etc., and changes in net working capital, 
capital outlays and other cash flows. The adjustment for non-cash expenses 
effectively neutralizes accounting related biases. The profit-sharing ratio should be 
fix in a way that the initial investment (I) is recoverable given the required profit 
rate and term. PSR, therefore, is a function of the term, average expected earnings, 
initial investment and the required profit rate: 
PSR = ƒ (I, T, ē, k)..............................(2) 
Where ēis the average of expected annual earnings. Besides, the appropriate term 
should vary according to the project being financed. Generically, the term can be 
determined as 
Term =[
𝐼(1+𝑘)
ē𝑡∙𝑃𝑆𝑅
] ≤ 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒 … … … … … … … …(3) 
The desired profit rate k is the also not known. While trading, k should be 
a market-derived rate, just like the desired return for stocks. However, considering 
the terminal nature the profit/risk sharing, the desired profit should be lesser than 
the expensesof the issuing equity but greater than cost of debt. Since the rightsof 
the instrument are directly on the earnings of the specific asset/orproject, 
organized by the company’s other responsibilities, the desired returnmay virtually 
be dependent on the instabilities of the asset’s earnings. Additionally, as a market-
traded instrument, the desired return isessentially market determined. Thus, for a 
particular set of anticipated future earnings, term and PSR, the desired return will 
be implied in its market price: 
% K= [
ē∙𝑡𝑃𝑆𝑅
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
] ∙ 100 … … … ….(4) 
Percentage k, or holding period return, will comprise both the returns from profits 
received and capital gains; k then would be reliant on the instability of anticipated 
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earnings (ê), PSR and market factors. Indicative k can be derived from the ROA 
(return on assets) of similar projects/industries. This means, the returns of a firm 
in the same industry as that of the project can be unlevered to estimate k. 
 
D.  RESULS AND DISCUSSION 
Profit sharing can only works where a project make a profit. However, in a 
situation where a project or asset is a cost center, other plans could be applied, such 
as ijarah (leasing) contract. More so, to evade fixity the ijarah payments, that is 
normally amortizing, can take in an amount benchmarked on industry performance. 
This benchmark could be, for instance, the average industry ROA or the average 
ROA of the top 5 players in the given industry. Thus, the ijarah payment could be 
derived as: 
Ijarah payment = Ijt = [amortization amount for principal + rent + (0.3 ·industry 
ROA)]...................................(5) 
All the three items can be ascertained so that based on the desired profit 
rate, the financier can anticipate to recuperate the investment. Also, under ijarah-
based instrument, the benefit to the ‘borrowing’ company over an absolute debt-
based bond finance will be that the company may be able to miss payments in bad 
times, but with the stipulation that either the term is amplified or ‘missed’ 
payments are made collective. This indicates that there is no fixity. Therefore the 
amount to be receive by the investor for the duration cannot be foretell. Besides, 
the anticipated cash-flows in the form of ijarah payments from the investment can 
be ascertained. Given these expected cash flows, the price of the instrument and the 
desired return can be: 
Price = ∑
𝐼𝑗𝑡
(1+𝐾)𝑡
𝑡
𝑛=1 ........................... (6)                                                        
           %k= [
∑ 𝐼𝑗𝑡
𝑡
𝑛=1
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
] ∙ 100.................................(7) 
The equilibrium ‘price’ would be where the NPV is zero, or:Price– Initial 
investment = 0                 (8) 
In any given year, the holding period return would be: 
% k = [
𝐼𝑗𝑡
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
] ∙ 100 +(
𝑝1  −𝑝0
𝑝0
) ∙ 100.........................(9)                                                                                                              
About the example of the previous modified mudarabah instrument, market trading 
would entail that overall returns will be a mixture of the received ijarah payments 
and capital gains/losses. Therefore, there are two fundamentals that ensure fixity is 
evaded. First is the benchmark within the industry ROA and, second, the capital 
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gains/losses. In addition to avoiding fixity, the benchmark portion of the 
ijarahpayment has the advantage of keeping the ‘borrowing’ firm’s management 
benchmarked to the best in the industry. 
 
E. CONCLUSION  
The study aims at arguing that the current interest-based debt financing 
regime is characteristically unsteady and crisis prone. This has been confirmed by 
previous studies who claimed that debt and leveraging are the major causes of 
financial volatility in the present system. In contrast, Islamic finance, through its 
prominence on risk-sharing for the fulfillment of socio-economic goals based on 
the objectives of Shari`ah, offers the discipline that augments the outlook of 
consolidating the connection between finance and the real economy, therefore 
contributing towards overall financial stability. 
Moreover, Islamurges people to take individual and collective actions to attain 
social unity and cohesion and at the same time try to preserve and keep collectivity 
from all elements of disunity. Therefore, supporting maximum risk sharing is, 
assuredly, the ultimate objective of Islamic finance. It is for this reason that Islamic 
scholars consider profit–loss sharing and equity participation as first best 
instruments of risk sharing (Mirakhor and Iqbal, 2007). In this manner, social 
integration is enhanced. This study contributes to the existing literature by linking 
Islamic finance and corporate finance as well as highlighting the numerous benefits 
of risk-sharing finance, especially its potential to minimize, if not avoid, the debt-
induced financial crises that have plagued the world. 
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